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THE KING KONG CONTINGENT:  SHOULD THE MEDICARE
SECONDARY PAYER STATUTE REACH TO FUTURE MEDICAL
EXPENSES IN PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS?
Norma S. Schmidt*
When Medicare liens are involved in personal injury settlements,
Medicare has been likened to an “800-pound gorilla” at the negotiations
table.1  Any significant Medicare lien can dominate settlement negotiations
because the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) statute grants Medicare a first-
priority right to prompt reimbursement for all pre-settlement conditional
payments and wields the threat of double-damages for failing to fully consider
Medicare’s interests.2  If the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) continues the trend of extending the MSP statute’s reach, Medicare-
eligible recipients of personal injury settlements risk losing much more of
their settlement proceeds, not only to satisfy existing Medicare liens, but also
to pay for future medical expenses that would otherwise be covered by
Medicare.3  With such an expansion, the great “gorilla at the table” could start
to take on the mythic proportions of Carl Denham’s “Eighth Wonder of the
World.”4
This note will first consider the legal boundaries of the MSP statute, and
will then review arguments for and against adopting a new model similar to
that in worker’s compensation, which “sets aside” a portion of a settlement to
cover future accident-related expenses for Medicare recipients.5  The
conclusion reached herein is that the MSP statute should not be expanded due
to fundamental differences in worker’s compensation and personal injury
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6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000) (explaining Medicare Part A); 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2000) (explaining
Medicare Part B).
7. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-09.pdf.
8. United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 874 (11th Cir. 2003).  The language of the MSP
statute (including the 2003 Amendments) reads in part:
(2) Medicare secondary payer
(A) In general
Payment under this subchapter may not be made, except as provided in subparagraph (B),
with respect to any item or service to the extent that—
(i) payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, with respect to
the item or service as required under paragraph (1), or
(ii) payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made under a
workmen’s compensation law or plan of the United States or a State or under an automobile
or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or under no fault
insurance.
In this subsection, the term “primary plan” means a group health plan or large group
health plan, to the extent that clause (i) applies, and a workmen’s compensation law or plan,
an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or no fault
insurance, to the extent that clause (ii) applies.  An entity that engages in a business, trade,
or profession shall be deemed to have a self-insured plan if it carries its own risk (whether
by a failure to obtain insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in part.
(B) Conditional payment
(i) Authority to make conditional payment.
The Secretary may make payment under this title with respect to an item or service if a
primary plan described in subparagraph (A)(ii) has not made or cannot reasonably be
expected to make payment with respect to such item or service promptly (as determined in
cases, as well as significant problems with the current worker’s compensation
model of Medicare Set Aside (MSA) arrangements.  However, if such an
expansion to the scope of the MSP statute is made, it should only occur after
the serious problems with the current worker’s compensation model have been
resolved.
MEDICARE AND THE MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER STATUTE
Medicare is the federal health insurance program for individuals over the
age of sixty-five and individuals under age sixty-five with permanent
disabilities.6  Medicare provides healthcare benefits to nearly forty-three
million Americans who have paid premiums for coverage, either directly, as
in the doctor’s insurance coverage of Medicare Part B or the prescription drug
coverage of Medicare Part D, or by paying taxes while working, as in the
hospital insurance of Medicare Part A.7
The MSP laws are “a collection of statutory provisions codified during
the 1980s with the intention of reducing federal health care costs.”8  Before
2006] THE KING KONG CONTINGENT 471
accordance with regulations).  Any such payment by the Secretary shall be conditioned on
reimbursement to the appropriate Trust Fund in accordance with the succeeding provisions
of this subsection.
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).  For the legislative history of the MSP, see, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 389 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5752.
9. Walters v. Leavitt, 376 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A); Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Responding
to skyrocketing Medicare costs, Congress in 1980 enacted the Medicare Secondary Payer legislation . . .
requiring Medicare to serve as the secondary payer when a beneficiary has overlapping insurance
coverage.”).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B); Baxter, 345 F.3d at 875 (“In a nutshell, the MSP declares that,
under certain conditions, Medicare will be the secondary rather than primary payer for its insureds.
Consequently, Medicare is empowered to recoup from the rightful primary payer (or from the recipient of
such payment) if Medicare pays for a service that was, or should have been, covered by the primary
insurer.”).  See Robert T. Lewis & Patty Meifert, Considering Medicare’s Interest in Liability Cases,
NAMSAP  NEWSLETTER (National Alliance of Medicare Set-Aside Professionals), April 2005, at 3.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iv) (“The United States shall be subrogated (to the extent of
payment made under this subchaptertitle . . . for such an item or service) to any right under this subsection
of an individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or service under a primary plan”).
13. JOHN ALLAN APPLEMAN, 1-3 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.1 (2d ed. 2002).
14. Id.
the advent of the MSP statute, Medicare would typically pay for healthcare for
Medicare beneficiaries, even when another health insurance provider had a
responsibility to pay.9  Under the MSP statute, Medicare does not pay for
medical services when payment “has been made or can reasonably be
expected to be made” by a primary plan, including workers’ compensation,
liability insurance plans, and self-insured plans.10  If such a primary plan does
not pay promptly, Medicare may pay for healthcare with the condition that it
later be reimbursed.  Medicare can then take action to recoup its conditional
payments from either the primary payer or any recipient of a primary plan’s
payment.11
The MSP statute also grants Medicare a right of subrogation.12
Subrogation developed as an equitable doctrine preventing unjust enrichment
“by substituting one person or entity in place of another in regard to some
claim or right the second person or entity has against a third party.”13  This
means that the insurer is,
“substituted” for the insured in regard to either all or some portion of the rights that the
insured has to receive compensation from another source.  An insurer asserting a
subrogation right is usually viewed as “standing in the shoes” of the insured so that the
insurer’s rights are equal to, but no greater than, those of the insured.14
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15. Randal Kauffman, The War of the Cockatrice, 60 TEX. B.J. 310, 311 (1997).
16. As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its analysis of health insurance subrogation rights:
“[a]mong the courts that have addressed the question of the existence of a common-law equitable right of
subrogation, the weight of authority concludes that no such right exists in the health insurance field.”
Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 437 (N.J. 2001) (citations omitted).  Some courts have even gone so far
as to say that it would be unjust enrichment on the part of the insurer, should subrogation be permitted
along with the retention of the premiums paid by the insured, resulting in a “double recovery.”  Johnny C.
Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine:  Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance
Subrogation, 70 MO. L. REV. 723, 737 (2005) (citations omitted).
17. Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ark.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 2004 U.S. Briefs 1506, 8 (2006) (No. 04-1506) (citations
omitted).
18. United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 875 (11th Cir. 2003).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Compare Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir.
2003), with Baxter, 345 F.3d at 898 (“We respectfully disagree with the Goetzmann dicta to the effect that
there cannot be a self-insured plan absent a setting aside of the funds and formal procedures.  However,
especially because the statutory definition of a primary plan expressly includes self-insured plans, we see
nothing in that context requiring either a set-aside of funds or formal procedures.”).
20. See Baxter, 345 F.3d at 887.  See also Courtney A. Rogers, Subrogation and Medicare:
Eleventh Circuit Holding Facilitates Enforcement of Medicare Secondary Payor Statute—United States
Medicare’s rights, however, are greater than a common law subrogation
claim as Medicare’s “right of recovery . . . takes precedence over the claims
of any other person or entity,”15 and reaches further than courts have generally
permitted in the case of private health insurance.16  As explained by the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA):
in most states, it is the claims of an injured plaintiff that take priority over the subrogated
claims of an entity that paid for the plaintiff’s medical care.  Under the “made whole”
doctrine, a health insurer may not obtain reimbursement for medical payments from a
third-party tortfeasor until the injured plaintiff has been fully compensated for his
damages . . . (34 states have adopted the made whole doctrine by statute or court
decision).17
MEDICARE’S RIGHTS AS A SECONDARY PAYER IN LIABILITY SETTLEMENTS
Despite the straightforward function of the MSP statute, “the statute is
structurally complex—a complexity that has produced considerable confusion
among courts attempting to construe it.”18  CMS had mixed success in its early
attempts to recover Medicare liens from liability awards or settlements
because courts had different interpretations of, for instance, what constitutes
a “self-insured” plan,19 and whether Medicare payments should be subject to
reimbursement even if a primary payer could not be expected to pay
promptly.20
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v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 549, 550 (2003).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A).
22. E.g., Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 498 (“It is clear from the regulations implementing the MSP
statute that the existence of a self-insurance plan requires that there by some form of arrangement—the
creation ex ante of a fund and distribution procedures—for making potential payments to a set of
prospective claimants.”); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
99-20593, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2959, at *37-38 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2001) (“The statute’s requirement
of the existence of a primary ‘plan’ connotes some type of formal arrangement by which an entity
consciously undertakes to set aside funds to cover potential future liabilities and a formal procedure for
processing claims made against that fund pursuant to the terms of the ‘plan.’”).
23. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 489, 503-04. 
24. Baxter, 345 F.3d at 898.
25. Id. at 888-89, 892.
26. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 [hereinafter MMA],
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
27. MMA, § 301, 117 Stat. at 2071.
The MSP statute defines a “primary plan” as “a group health plan . . . a
workmen’s compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance
policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or no fault insurance.”21  Some
courts held that an uninsured defendant without a formal self-insurance plan
did not meet the criteria for a primary plan from which Medicare could
recover conditional payments.22  After a string of lower court decisions denied
Medicare’s attempts to recover conditional payments from personal injury
awards, the Fifth Circuit, in Thompson v. Goetzmann, a suit against the
manufacturer of a defective prosthesis, went so far as to threaten sanctions
against the government for its continued pursuit of reimbursements from
liability settlements involving alleged tortfeasors who have no formalized plan
of self-insurance.23  Shortly after the Goetzmann decision, the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Baxter, a class-action suit against the manufacturers of
silicone breast-implants, disagreed with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
regarding the meaning of “self-insured,” stating that a formal “setting aside of
the funds and formal procedures” is not a requirement.24  The Eleventh Circuit
in Baxter also held that a primary insurer’s prompt payment is not a pre-
requisite for Medicare reimbursement; however, it also cited a number of
court decisions which came to the opposite conclusion due to multiple
possible interpretations of the MSP statutory language.25
In late 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA).26  The Act, while best known
for the new Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit,27 also contains little
publicized changes, buried within the Act’s 416 pages, which greatly
strengthen the language of the MSP statute and resolve many of the
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28. For a discussion of the primary effects of the MMA on the MSP statute, see Brown v.
Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 257-58 (4th Cir. 2004).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A); MMA, § 301, 117 Stat. at 2222.  See Roger J. Larue & Daniel Q.
Posin, Medicaid, ERISA, and Other Medical Liens Against Personal Injury Recoveries:  Plus Congress’
2003 Christmas Gift to Medicare, 51 LA B.J. 334, 335 (2004).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii); MMA, § 301, 117 Stat. at 2221.  See Brown v. Thompson, 374
F.3d at 258.
31. MMA, § 301, 117 Stat. at 2221-22.
32. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c) (2005).  See Tate & Holloway, supra note 1.
33. Larue & Posin, supra note 29; Lewis & Meifert, supra note 11.
34. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(b) (2005).
35. Id. § 411.24(g).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c)(2).  For a discussion of the interest
calculations on the MSP debts, see Matthew L. Garretson & Jason Wolf, Settlements:  Addressing Claims
for Reimbursements and Preserving Benefits 12 (2005), available at http://www.utahbar.org/cle/
annualconvention/materials/ho_settlements_2005.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
discrepancies in interpretation by the courts.28  With the sting of the
Goetzmann decision still fresh, Congress elaborated the definition of “self-
insured” to include, for instance, corporations that simply carry the risk of not
purchasing insurance.29  The “prompt payment” language from section (A)(ii)
was deleted from the statute, making it clear that even if a primary payer
cannot be reasonably expected to pay in the near future, Medicare
nevertheless has a right to reimbursement.30  These two significant changes to
the MSP statute are considered “technical” and “clarifying,” respectively, and
are effective retroactively from the date of the original statutory enactments.31
The MSP statute, especially after the 2003 MMA “clarifications,” makes
Medicare a dominating force in settlement negotiations.  Medicare’s recovery
of conditional medical payments takes precedence over any other claim
against settlement proceeds, including those of Medicaid, and trumps even the
injured party’s right to reimbursement.32  Medicare’s extensive right to
recovery has thus been described as a “super lien.”33  The MSP statute gives
CMS a cause of action in any situation in which a primary plan responsible for
payment of an item or service fails to make the appropriate payment to
Medicare.34
Everyone participating in a settlement involving Medicare liens should
be aware of the scope of the MSP statute, as it grants CMS the right to recoup
its conditional payments from a “beneficiary, provider, supplier, physician,
attorney, State agency or private insurer that has received a third party
payment.”35  If Medicare is not reimbursed and CMS takes legal action, the
MSP statute grants CMS the right to collect double damages plus interest for
any attempt at cost shifting from a primary payer onto Medicare.36
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37. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c); Garretson & Wolf, supra note 36, at 12.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).  See Garretson & Wolf, supra note 36, at 10.
39. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c); Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995) (“HHS has
interpreted the MSP legislation to allow full recovery of conditional Medicare payments even when the
beneficiary’s settlement is for less than her total damages (i.e., a discounted settlement).”).  See also
Garretson & Wolf, supra note 36, at 10 (Only with a court order on the merits of the case will Medicare
hold exempt from its MSP claim those portions of the award allocated to pain and suffering, etc.).  In the
case of Medicaid liens, the Supreme Court recently held that the state Medicaid agency was limited in its
right to reimbursement to the portion of a personal injury settlement designated for medical care.  Ark.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006).  While Ahlborn specifically involves
a Medicaid lien, many of the same issues also apply to Medicare liens.  Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers
of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 17, at 2.
40. Garretson & Wolf, supra note 36, at 11.  See also Matthew L. Garretson, A Practical Approach
to Proactive Client-counseling and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in Aggregate Settlements, 6 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 19, 36 (Fall 2004).
41. 1-9 JOHN J. REGAN ET AL., TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY  § 9.19(4)
(2005).
42. See Tate & Holloway, supra note 1.
CMS is permitted to recover the full amount of a Medicare lien even if
the amount of the lien exceeds the amount a plaintiff receives.37  This right to
full recovery applies also to settlement agreements lacking a determination or
admission of liability.38  CMS may seek reimbursement of Medicare liens
from the entire settlement amount (less attorneys’ fees) because the MSP
regulations do not require Medicare to adjust its lien amount according to the
intended allocation of a settlement award.39  For instance, in situations where
parties have agreed that a pre-existing condition accounts for a portion of the
medical expenses, Medicare will not necessarily reduce the amount it seeks
to recover accordingly.40  Thus “[t]he practitioner who negotiates settlements
with an insurance carrier . . . should not rely on Medicare to pick up any
unreimbursed medical expenses or to assume a proportionate share of the total
damages.”41
While protecting the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program by making
the program a secondary payer makes sense from a financial standpoint, the
broad scope of the MSP statute and CMS’s increased enforcement efforts have
serious consequences for settling personal injury cases.  The existence of
potentially huge medical liens makes it more difficult to reach an agreement
in the first place, as the settlement amount must fully account for conditional
Medicare payments, over and above the additional needs of the plaintiff,
leading to larger settlement amounts.42  Parties are often forced to settle
without even knowing the exact amount of an outstanding Medicare lien.  As
explained by ATLA:
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43. Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 17, at 11.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 411.28 (2005); Tate & Holloway, supra note 1:
The regulations and internal manuals interpreting the MSP statute allow for the waiver of repayment
of benefits when repayment defeats the purposes of the statute.  The benefits recipient must request
a waiver from the CMS, with the government’s waiver decision based largely on the recipient’s
ability to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses.  These expenses include food, clothing, rent,
maintenance, insurance, and expenses for the support for others for whom the beneficiary is legally
responsible.
45. United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 875 (11th Cir. 2003).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(d) (2005).  Medicare distinguishes between a “commutation” of future
medical expenses, which are “intended to compensate the individual for all future medical expenses
required because of the work-related injury or disease,” 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(a), in which case Medicare will
not pay for future medical expenses until such amount has been expended, 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(a), and a
“compromise” in which liability may be disputed, 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(b)(1).  The regulations provide that
unless the compromise settlement “appears to represent an attempt to shift to Medicare the responsibility
for payment of medical expenses for the treatment of a work-related condition,” 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(b)(2),
The federal Medicare program and its contractors are notorious for refusing to provide
information regarding claimed lien amounts until after a tort claim has been settled. . . .
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs are forced to bear not only the uncertainty of
litigation, but also substantial uncertainty about the amount of any recovery that may be
claimed by the government for reimbursement of medical costs.43
The potential harshness of the MSP statute is softened somewhat by the
opportunity to seek a hardship waiver from CMS, which may be granted based
on difficulty of a recovery recipient to meet daily living expenses such as
food, clothing, and rent.44  Nevertheless, the MSP statute gives CMS
tremendous power when Medicare liens are involved in personal injury
settlements.
MEDICARE’S ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AS A SECONDARY PAYER FOR FUTURE
MEDICAL EXPENSES IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SETTLEMENTS
Medicare has a long history as a secondary payer in workers’
compensation cases.  The MSP statute originated in laws from the 1960s,
which required reimbursement of Medicare payments made to an individual
eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.45  The MSP laws require
reimbursement for payments made prior to a workers’ compensation award or
settlement.  Moreover, the laws make Medicare a secondary payer for
accident-related future medical expenses when there has been a
“commutation” of future medical expenses in the settlement agreement, or in
the case of disputed liability, a “compromise” settlement in which payments
for future medical expenses have been foreclosed.46  The MSP regulations
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Medicare will pay for future accident-related medical expenses when a lump-sum compromise settlement
forecloses the possibility of future payment of workers’ compensation benefits, 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(d)(1),
unless the settlement specifically allocates a portion of the settlement as compensation for future medical
expenses, 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(d)(2).  There seems to be some inconsistent use of the terms “commutation’
and “compromise” by CMS.  For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Edward M. Welch, Medicare
and Worker’s Compensation After the 2003 Amendments 10-11 (2004), available at
http://www.lir.msu.edu/wcc/Medicare/Medicare%20Web%2004.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
47. 42 C.F.R § 411.46(b)(2); Rafael Gonzalez, Reasonable Consideration of Medicare’s Interests
in Workers’ Compensation Settlements, 77 FLA. B.J. at 81-82 (Nov. 2003).
48. Memorandum from Thomas L. Grissom, Dir., Ctr. for Medicare Mgmt. to All Reg’l Adm’r
(Apr. 22, 2003), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/Downloads/
42203Memo.rtf.
49. Id.
50. DAVID  B. TORREY ET  AL. & ANDREW E. GREENBERG, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:  LAW AND
PRACTICE § 15:116 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
51. Memorandum from Parashar B. Patel, Deputy Dir., Purchasing Policy Group, Ctr. for Medicare
give CMS the authority to disregard a settlement allocation if cost-shifting
onto Medicare for future medical expenses is apparent.  This provision
permits Medicare to deny coverage of that condition in the future.47  As
explained in a CMS memorandum:
Medicare cannot accept the terms of the settlement as to an allocation of funds of any
type if the settlement does not adequately address Medicare’s interests.  If Medicare’s
interests are not reasonably considered, Medicare will refuse to pay for services related
to the [Worker’s Compensation] injury (and otherwise reimbursable by Medicare) until
such expenses have exhausted the amount of the entire [Worker’s Compensation]
settlement.48
Consider a hypothetical example in which the parties to a workers’
compensation case settle for $75,000 with both parties agreeing that $50,000
adequately represents loss of income and $25,000 adequately represents future
medical expenses.  If CMS believes the $25,000 is too low of an amount for
future medical expenses and is an attempt to shift costs onto Medicare, the
regulations allow Medicare to refuse to pay for any accident-related medical
expense until the entire $75,000 has been spent on the cost of such care.49
While these regulations have been in effect for many years, Medicare has
only relatively recently begun to aggressively assert secondary payer status for
future medical expenses.50  CMS issued a Memorandum in 2001 addressing
the commutation of future benefits in worker’s compensation cases and
explaining the use of Medicare Set-Aside (MSA) arrangements to prevent
Medicare from making mistaken payments for medical expenses related to the
work injury when a primary payer has already made a payment intended to
cover future medical expenses.51  With an MSA arrangement, a portion of the
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Mgmt. to All Assoc. Reg’l Adm’r (July 23, 2001) [hereinafter Patel Memo], available at
http://new.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/Downloads/72301Memo.rtf.  See Lewis & Meifert,
supra note 11, at 4.
52. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Workers Compensation Medicare Set-aside
Arrangements [hereinafter CMS, WCMSAs], at http://new.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgency
Services/04_wcsetaside.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
53. Id.
54. CMS, WCMSAs, supra note 52:
A WCMSA may be submitted to CMS for review in the following situations:
The claimant is currently a Medicare beneficiary and the total settlement amount is greater than
$25,000; OR
The claimant has a “reasonable expectation” of Medicare enrollment within 30 months of the
settlement date and the anticipated total settlement amount for future medical expenses and
disability/lost wages over the life or duration of the settlement agreement is expected to be greater
than $250,000.
55. Lewis & Meifert, supra note 11.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
57. John J. Campbell, Medicare Set Aside Arrangements for Future Medical Expenses in Third
Party Liability Settlements, THE MEDICARE SET ASIDE BULLETIN , Feb. 14, 2005, at http://www.jjcelderlaw
settlement is “set aside” and applied specifically to future medical expenses
which would otherwise be covered by Medicare.52  Only after this amount has
been spent will Medicare begin to pay for medical care related to the
accident.53  For cases meeting certain criteria, CMS will provide pre-
settlement approval of the MSA amount.54
MSA arrangements have become “standard practice” for addressing
Medicare’s interests in workers’ compensation settlements, even though there
appears to be no case law requiring MSAs.55  Medicare’s pre-approval of a
workers’ compensation settlement eliminates the risk of a future denial of
Medicare benefits, and assures the parties that Medicare’s interests have been
reasonably considered.
MUST MEDICARE’S INTEREST BE “REASONABLY CONSIDERED” REGARDING
FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES IN PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS?
The MSP statute broadly states that Medicare will not pay for “any item
or service to the extent that . . . payment has been made or can reasonably be
expected to be made under a workmen’s compensation law or plan . . . or
liability insurance policy or plan. . .” for an item or service otherwise covered
by Medicare.56  When a personal injury settlement makes a specific allocation
for future medical expenses, CMS may be able to argue that such a payment
“has been made,” and that Medicare should be a secondary payer to that
portion of the settlement.57  However, the regulations dealing with Medicare
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.com/CMS%20TPL%20News.htm.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 411.46 (2005) (The regulation stating that Medicare will not pay for post-settlement
medical expenses until the amount allocated in the settlement for future medical expenses has been spent
is found under the subsection “Limitations on Medicare Payment for Services Covered Under Workers’
Compensation.”).  See Campbell, supra note 57.
59. 42 C.F.R. § 411.46(b)(2).
60. Lewis & Meifert, supra note 11, at 4:
CMS has advised that it is not asking for Medicare Set-Aside arrangements, nor does it have any
current plans for a formal process for reviewing and approving Medicare Set-Aside arrangements,
in liability cases.
However, even though no formal process exists, there is an obligation to inform CMS when past or
future medicals were a consideration in reaching the liability settlement, judgment, or award
whether or not specifically provided for in the settlement, judgment, or award in cases involving a
Medicare beneficiary.
In addition, CMS expects that any settlement funds that were intended to compensate for future
medicals be spent for that purpose before any claims related to the settlement, judgment or award
are submitted to Medicare for payment.
61. John J. Campbell, Update on Medicare’s Position Regarding Future Medical Expenses in Third
Party Liability Settlements, THE MEDICARE SET ASIDE BULLETIN , Feb. 21, 2005, at
http://www.jjcelderlaw.com/CMS%20TPL%20News%20Update.htm (“CMS currently has no official
procedure for review of Medicare Set Aside Arrangements (MSAs) in TPL settlements . . . . However, CMS
does require that the parties “reasonably consider Medicare’s interests” in TPL settlements.”).
62. Garretson & Wolf, supra note 5, at 20 (“While there is not yet published standards to utilize in
calculating set asides in liability settlements, the general standard for ‘set aside’ calculation is a ‘Good
Faith’ standard.”).
63. See Lewis & Meifert, supra note 11, at 4.
as a secondary payer to post-settlement medical expenses are specific to
worker’s compensation,58 weakening the argument that the MSP statute
applies to future medical expenses in personal injury cases.  Even if the MSP
statute arguably applies to a specific allocation of future medical expenses in
personal injury cases, Medicare’s authority to disregard a settlement allocation
that appears to shift costs onto Medicare refers only to the treatment of a
“work-related condition.”59
Despite these legal limitations, CMS is beginning to assert secondary
payer status for future medical expenses in any personal injury settlement in
which future medical costs are a “consideration,” even if there is no allocation
for future medical expenses in the settlement agreement.60  CMS is working
on an official statement regarding future medical expenses in third-party
liability settlements, but in the meantime it requires the parties to “reasonably
consider Medicare’s interests.”61  But what does “reasonably consider” mean?
Is this based on a “good faith” standard?62  If future medical expenses are not
adequately designated or properly expended, who will be held responsible?63
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65. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
66. Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2003).
67. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
68. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States EPA, 53 F.3d. 1324, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[w]here . . .
the  regulations and other policy statements are unclear, where [GE’s] interpretation is reasonable, and
where the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive reading of the regulatory requirements, a regulated
party is not ‘on notice’ of the agency’s ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and may not be
punished.”).
69. Expansions of the MSP are discussed in Baxter, 345 F.3d at 877 (“Since enacting the MSP
statute, Congress has expanded its reach several times, making Medicare secondary payer to a greater array
preprimary coverage sources, and creating a larger spectrum of beneficiaries who no longer may look to
Medicare as their primary source of coverage.”).
What kind of documentation is required by CMS?64  Such important questions
have not been answered.
In a situation where Congress has not directly addressed the issue in the
statutory language, an agency’s interpretation will be upheld if it is based on
a “permissible construction of the statute.”65  However, a “court need not defer
to statutory interpretation that is ‘nothing more than the litigation position of
agency counsel that is wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or
administrative practice.’”66  The language of the MSP statute and regulations
does not seem to support a deference to CMS’s position that Medicare is a
secondary payer for post-settlement medical expenses outside of workers’
compensation cases, except perhaps to the extent that a specific allocation has
been made for future medical expenses in the settlement agreement.67
When the regulations and policy statements are unclear, and when the
other party’s interpretation is reasonable, a court may hold that there has been
no notice of the agency’s interpretation of the law, and a party not abiding by
the agency’s position may not be held liable.68  Because CMS has not issued
any clear guidance as to what parties in personal injury settlements are
expected to do regarding future medical expenses, and because the regulations
are silent as to any authority to claim secondary payer status for future
medical expenses except in workers’ compensation cases, CMS’ position that
parties must “reasonably consider” Medicare’s interest regarding future
medical expenses in personal injury cases may be unenforceable not only due
to a lack of legal authority, but also due to a lack of notice.
While CMS’ position that Medicare’s interests be “reasonably
considered” in personal injury settlements involving future medical expenses
may be in line with the trend towards expanding the reach of the MSP
statute,69 this position does not appear to be a legal requirement.  As one
workers’ compensation scholar put it, “[w]hy shouldn’t Medicare be treated
2006] THE KING KONG CONTINGENT 481
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71. 67 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. 3 DAVID  W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, 3-18 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 18.01(2) (2006).
73. Id. at. § 10.02 (Indicating that future medical expenses are just one type of damages among
many being considered.).
74. Id. at. § 10.01.
as an adversary?  Adversaries have certain rights, they must be given notice
and an opportunity to protect their interest but why should other parties be
expected to protect their interest, especially since Congress has not seen fit to
require this in the law?”70
SHOULD THE MSP STATUTE BE EXPANDED TO COVER FUTURE MEDICAL
EXPENSES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES?
The fundamental differences between workers’ compensation and
personal injury make the application of the MSP statute toward future medical
expenses in personal injury cases more unwieldy than in worker’s
compensation.  As explained by the court in Zinman v. Shalala, an analogy
between workers’ compensation and liability damages is inappropriate
because workers’ compensation awards are based on precise calculations of
future wages and medical expenses.71  Personal injury awards, on the other
hand, consider non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life, as well as non-compensatory punitive damages.72  Although
future medical expenses are often a factor in personal injury settlements, the
wide range of other possible considerations makes the apportionment of
damages much more complicated than in workers’ compensation cases.73
Causation may also be more difficult to prove in personal injury cases.
For instance, in medical malpractice, the plaintiff was usually already
suffering from an illness or injury when the alleged negligence occurred,
making it hard to distinguish the harm caused by negligence from the results
of the underlying condition.74  The difficulty of precisely apportioning
damages in personal injury cases would make it harder for CMS to determine
if there has been an attempt to shift costs of future medical expenses onto
Medicare.
While the greater difficulty in precisely apportioning damages in personal
injury settlements is an argument for not expanding the MSP statute to future
medical expenses in liability cases, the Ninth Circuit’s logic in Zinman v.
Shalala was to allow Medicare to claim up to the entire settlement amount in
reimbursement for conditional payments made, so as not to “require a
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75. 67 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1995).  However, ATLA has suggested that an equitable
apportionment of a settlement be done by the courts.  See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
76. Some states have specifically addressed the issue of subrogation regarding future medical
expenses.  In revising its collateral source rule, Pennsylvania declined to adopt a “future” collateral source
rule because “the legislature was sensitive to the fact that the existence of such coverage at the time the
plaintiff is injured is no guarantee that similar benefits will be available in the future.”  Gerald A. McHugh
Jr., Legislation Brings Sweeping Changes to Pennsylvania Tort Law:  An Interpretative Analysis of
Medical Malpractice Reform, 25 PA. L. WEEKLY  12 (2002).
77. CMS states that “Medicare will consider accepting a life care plan or similar evaluation from
a non-treating physician.  . . . Please note that such a life care plan or evaluation is not automatically
conclusive.”  Memorandum from Thomas L. Grissom, supra note 48, at 6.
78. See Eric J. Oxfeld, National Issues Affecting Impacting Workers’ Compensation, at
http://www.riskinstitute.org/FP_DOCS/Nationa lIssuesWC-PERISymposiumPaper.pdf (from
http://www.riskinstitute.org, follow “Symposium Center” hyperlink; then follow “Symposium Papers”
hyperlink; then follow “Workers’ Compensation:  Containing Costs and Managing Outcomes” hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (paper presented Dec. 11, 2003 at the Workers’ Compensation:  Containing
Costs and Managing Outcomes Symposium of the Public Entity Risk Institute) at 4.
79. Eric J. Oxfeld, Congress Must Reform Medicare Set Asides, FLA. UNDERWRITER, May 2006,
at S-9.
80. See Press Release, New Jersey State Bar Association, NJSBA Seeks Remedy to Workers’ Comp
Backlog, New Jersey State Bar Association (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.njsba.com/
press/press_title_link.cfm?pressid=413 (listing the 14 points contained in ABA Resolution No. 109B).
factfinding process to determine actual damages or . . . place Medicare at the
mercy of a victim’s or personal injury attorney’s estimate of damages.”75
Applying this same reasoning to future medical expenses is problematic due
to uncertainty of future healthcare costs.76  Specially trained healthcare
professionals may make an estimate of future medical needs, but these can
never be more than educated guesses, and Medicare will not necessarily
accept a doctor’s estimate of future healthcare expenses.77
Given the long delays and uncertainty which currently exist regarding
Medicare liens in personal injury settlements, there is reason to be concerned
that requiring CMS to not only verify an existing lien amount, but also pre-
approve an MSA proposal could lead to additional delays in the settlement
process.  Instances of workers’ compensation settlement negotiations falling
apart as parties wait a year or more for CMS approval of an MSA amount
have occurred.78  To remedy the situation, CMS has taken steps to make the
MSA approval process more efficient, although delays may still occur.79
Settlement delay and uncertainty are just two of the many problems with
the current model for protecting Medicare’s interests as a secondary payer of
post-settlement medical expenses in workers’ compensation cases.80  A
proposed set of fourteen changes to the current workers’ compensation model





85. See Welch, supra note 46, at 22.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Memorandum from Gerald Walters, Director of Financial Services Group, Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, to All Regional Administrators (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/Downloads/71105Memo.pdf (“Although a claimant
has no formal appeal rights with respect to the WCMSA process, beneficiaries do have appeal rights with
respect to specific denied claims.  If CMS denies a submitted claim for a service on the basis that CMS
determined the WCMSA amount has not been exhausted, the beneficiary may appeal that specific claim
denial through the administrative appeal process.”).
was adopted in February 2005 by the American Bar Association.81  The list
includes:
• Setting a deadline for approval of a settlement, “after which time approval should be
deemed to occur by law.”82
• Establishing an appeals procedure to dispute a CMS ruling, if necessary.83
• Allowing the cost of protecting Medicare’s interests in the settlement process and the
cost of administration of a set-aside trust to be funded out of the money allocated for
Medicare.84
Most of the concerns that underlie these proposals would also apply to
personal injury cases.  Consider, for instance, the lack of an appeals process
for a CMS denial of a workers’ compensation settlement allocation and
proposed MSA amount.85  If CMS rejects a MSA proposal, the injured person
risks a denial of future Medicare benefits.86  With the plaintiff having an
incentive to make the set-aside amount as low as possible, and CMS having
the incentive to make the set-aside amount as high as possible, clearly an
adversarial situation exists, but with CMS having the ultimate power of
approval or denial.  “Generally, the law guarantees an appeal from every final
decision of an administrative agency.  [However,] CMS apparently takes the
position that this is not a final determination.”87  Currently, any appeal can
only be made after a denial of specific Medicare benefits through the ordinary
administrative appeals process.88  This process could take years, and clearly
is not a satisfactory solution for parties needing a timely closure to a
settlement agreement.
In determining whether or not to approve a MSA proposal, CMS takes the
approach in workers’ compensation that it is not simply the apportionment of
the settlement being approved, but also whether the settlement amount is
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90. Id.  But see id. at 9-10 (explaining how CMS memorandum and regulations leave much
unanswered regarding the degree of deference owed to a state workers’ compensation agency’s approval
of a settlement allocation).
91. Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 17, at 9-10.
92. Id. at 10-11.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 13.
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sufficient to adequately cover the plaintiff’s future accident-related medical
expenses.89  This approach has raised concern among some scholars that “[t]he
federal government is now exercising scrutiny over state worker compensation
systems,” with CMS agents put in a position of “second guessing experienced
workers’ compensation people concerning liability under state workers’
compensation laws.”90  Similar concerns regarding the role of the federal
government in state law matters could also apply to personal injury cases.
An effect of the growing scope of the MSP statute is a disincentive to
settle when the amount recovered would primarily be paid to satisfy
government liens (and attorney fees), thus undermining the public interest of
efficient resolution of disputes through settlement.91  As explained by ATLA
in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Arkansas Department of Health
and Human Services v. Ahlborn:
an injured plaintiff who had received medical treatment funded by Medicaid would have
little incentive to settle her personal injury lawsuit for an amount that fell far short of her
total claim for damages, because any settlement award immediately would be reduced by
the total amount claimed by the state Medicaid agency for reimbursement of medical
expenses paid.  In addition, the plaintiff would be obliged to pay her attorneys’ fees and
costs.  Only the remainder would belong to the injured plaintiff.  Where the cost of
treatment funded by Medicaid was substantial, there would be relatively little, if any,
money left to compensate plaintiff for her injuries.
Under this scenario, all of the costs and risks of litigation, and all of the uncertainty
about potential recovery, would be borne by the plaintiff.  The state Medicaid agency
would bear none of this risk, and none of these costs, while obtaining a full recovery.92
While Ahlborn deals specifically with the state Medicaid liens, many of
ATLA’s arguments also apply to Medicare liens under the MSP statute.93  A
disincentive to settle will result in more plaintiffs “taking their chances” at
trial.  If the plaintiff loses at trial then Medicare recovers nothing.94  This
result undermines the whole purpose of the MSP statute, which is to have a
primary payer take financial responsibility for a Medicare recipient’s
healthcare and to leave Medicare as a payer of last resort.95  The problem
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100. Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 84-85.
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would only be compounded if the MSP statute were applied to future as well
as past medical expenses in personal injury cases.  Medicare set aside amounts
must now also account for future prescription drug needs,96 which can
potentially add hundreds of thousands of dollars to the set aside, making the
disincentive to settle that much greater.97
If the current model in workers’ compensation of MSA arrangements is
expanded to cover personal injury cases, the following situation could arise:
Plaintiff receives a personal injury settlement.  The bulk of this amount must
be paid to government healthcare liens for past medical expenses and attorney
fees, with the remainder used to fund a MSA account.  Once the MSA amount
has been approved, plaintiff is then burdened with administering the MSA
account.98  In workers’ compensation, at least for professionally administered
MSAs, the administrative process entails sending annual reports to the
regional Medicare office which “must indicate all of the expenditures from
and deposits made into the fund” for that period of time.99  The administrator
of the MSA account must ensure that billing for medical services is handled
properly, taking care that only those services which would otherwise be
covered by Medicare are paid for with MSA account funds.100  After the funds
have been exhausted, “the custodian must then forward a report to the
appropriate Medicare regional office detailing all expenses paid from the fund
and all deposits for the life of the fund.”101  The effective management of such
an account requires competency in healthcare claims administration, a clear
understanding of what services Medicare covers, and meticulous record
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keeping.  Such detailed administration requirements will be burdensome, if
not impossible, for most settlement recipients to handle.  Although a
professional may be hired to manage the account, under the current workers’
compensation model, such professional fees may not be paid for out of the
MSA account, resulting in significant additional expense.102  Due to the
extensive requirements of administering the MSA, mistakes are likely to occur
and it may be difficult to prove that all the funds were spent according to
CMS’s precise standards, raising the risk of contested Medicare eligibility
later.  The burden of the MSA administration makes allowing the continuation
of payments by Medicare without interruption more attractive than bringing
suit.  The latter alternative not only risks losing much of the settlement to
satisfy government healthcare liens, but also adds the burden of administering
an MSA account for future medical expenses.
Because of these difficulties, some scholars suggest that Medicare
administer the MSA accounts.103  This approach would relieve the individual
of the burden of self-administering the MSA, or the expense of hiring a
professional MSA administrator, and would ensure a smooth transition for the
settlement recipient back into Medicare-funded coverage once the MSA funds
have been depleted.  Other experts, however, have expressed concern that
having CMS administer MSA accounts would create an overly expensive
administrative burden for CMS and present difficult issues regarding the
appropriate fiduciary standards for administering such accounts.104
Regarding the proper allocation of settlement damages, ATLA presents
a proposal in its amicus brief in Ahlborn to adopt a rule of “equitable
apportionment” of a tort settlement among the various claimants in order to
“promote the efficient resolution of judicial disputes, likely increase state
Medicaid agency’s third-party liability reimbursements, and be equitable to
all claimants, including the state and federal governments.”105  Such hearings
are not unusual, as they are often used to apportion settlements into taxable
and non-taxable categories and are common practice in a number of states
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generally.106  If the MSP statute is expanded to cover future medical expenses
in personal injury cases, such an equitable apportionment could be a solution
for determining the appropriate amount of a personal injury settlement to fund
a MSA account.  This proposal would eliminate the conflict of interest
inherent in the current workers’ compensation model, in which CMS has both
the incentive to make the MSA amount as high as possible as well as the final
authority to determine the set-aside amount, with no opportunity for the
plaintiff to appeal CMS’ decision.107
RECENTLY PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO CHANGE THE MEDICARE
SECONDARY PAYER STATUTE REGARDING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
SETTLEMENTS AND MEDICARE SET ASIDE ARRANGEMEN TS
In May 2006, House Bill 5309 was introduced which, if enacted, would
make significant changes to how the MSP statute applies to workers’
compensation settlements.108  The bill provides guidance in calculating the set-
aside amount and addresses many of the problems with the current worker’s
compensation model of MSA arrangements.  For instance, the problem of
lengthy wait times for MSA approval is addressed by granting automatic
approval of any set-aside proposal unless a notice of determination of
disapproval is received within sixty days of receipt by CMS.109  The bill also
permits the costs of “establishing, administering, or securing approval for the
Medicare set-aside” to be paid out of the amount set aside.110  The current
problem of a lack of an appeals process for a CMS set aside determination is
resolved by entitling a party to a reconsideration by CMS (within 30 days of
requesting one), a hearing with an administrative judge (within 90 days of
requesting one), and subsequent judicial review.111
The bill also includes an option to pay the MSA amount directly to
CMS.112  However, rather than an arrangement in which CMS administers the
MSA accounts, this option appears to be a direct, irrevocable assignment.
Because under the proposed bill, MSA administration expenses may be paid
out of the MSA account, no financial incentive to make an up-front transfer
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directly to CMS would exist.113  Furthermore, such an upfront payment may
also eliminate the opportunity for remaining MSA funds to be distributed to
a selected beneficiary at the individual’s death.114
One of the most significant changes proposed by the bill is a complete
exemption from the MSP statute (as opposed to the current CMS review
threshold) of any workers’ compensation settlement with a present value of
less than $250,000, adjusted annually based on the national wage index, as
well as any compromise settlement with a “present value that is not more than
20 percent of the present value of the total amount that could have been
payable under the applicable workers’ compensation law or similar plan if the
claim involved had not been subject to a compromise[.]”115  The $250,000
“present value” is generously calculated, as it could be based on the purchase
price of an annuity (as opposed to the projected payout) and would not
include, for instance, the amount needed to satisfy prior unpaid medical
expenses, Medicaid liens, attorney fees for the claimant, etc.116  The bill also
provides a “safe harbor” option for determining a qualified MSA amount,
which would be the greater of “10 percent of the present value of the
agreement” or 15 percent of the payments provided by the agreement for total
medical expenses.117  While it is sensible to exempt certain smaller settlements
from the demands of the MSP statute, the proposed bill has also been
criticized for making the exemptions too large and the safe harbor too easily
manipulated, potentially shifting tremendous cost from workers’
compensation carriers onto Medicare.118
CONCLUSION
With approximately forty-two million Americans relying on Medicare for
their healthcare coverage, the financial stability of the program is of critical
importance, and the MSP statute is an important means of achieving this
goal.119  Medicare’s financial well-being, however, must be carefully balanced
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with other important factors, such as a plaintiff’s interest in being fairly
compensated for an injury and the necessity of efficient litigation processes.
There are a number of compelling reasons for not applying the MSP
statute to future medical expenses in personal injury settlements.  Most
significantly, there seems to be no legal authority to do so, at least where there
has been no specific settlement allocation for future medical expenses, and
Medicare lacks the regulatory authority to reapportion a settlement in personal
injury cases.120  As for extending the reach of the MSP statute to specifically
cover future medical expenses in personal injury cases, the problems with the
current workers’ compensation model, the complex nature of tort damages, the
uncertainty of future medical requirements, the potential burden to plaintiffs
in administering an MSA account, and the resulting disincentives to settle
speak strongly against such an expansion.
Should the legislature determine, however, that Medicare’s financial
benefit in expanding the MSP to apply to future medical expenses in personal
injury cases outweighs the countervailing interests, such an expansion should
only occur after the serious problems with the current workers’ compensation
model of MSAs have been resolved, perhaps through legislation incorporating
a number of the provisions of House Bill 5309.  This would not address all of
the issues presented by an expansion of the MSP statute into future medical
expenses in personal injury cases, but would help prevent the “gorilla at the
negotiations table” from reaching unnatural proportions.
